By Michael Burke
The world economy is not strong and the President of the United States is
sufficiently concerned about new shocks to it
that
he recently met the Greek Finance Minister to urge ‘flexibility on all
sides’ in the negotiations between the Syriza-led government and its creditors.
US concern is fully justified.
In any attempt to reach agreement it is important both to have an objective
assessment of the situation and to understand the perspective of those on the
opposite side of the table. In
Mythology that blocks progress in Greece
Martin Wolf, the chief economics commentator for the
Financial Times argues
that negotiations to date are dominated by myths. He demolishes some of
these key myths in turn: that a Greek exit would make the Eurozone stronger,
that it would make Greece stronger, that Greece caused the crisis driven by
private sector lending, that there has been no effort by Greeks to repay these
debts, that Greece has the capacity to repay them, and that defaulting on the
debts necessarily entails leaving the Eurozone.
Together, these provide a useful corrective to the propaganda emanating from
the Eurogroup of Finance Ministers and ECB Board members. Some if this is
slanderous, in repeating myths about ‘lazy Greeks’ (who have among the longest
working hours in Europe). Much of it is delusional,
based
on the notion that Greece can be forced to pay up, or forced out of the Euro
without any negative consequences for the meandering European or the world
economy.
Austerity ideology
The genuine belief in a false idea, or a demonstrably false system of ideas
constitutes an
ideology
in the strict meaning of that word. Inconvenient facts are relegated in
importance or distorted, and secondary or inconsequential matters are magnified.
Logical contortions become the norm.
All these are prevalent in the dominant ideology in economics, which is
supplemented by another key weapon, the helpful forecast. In Britain for
example, supporters of austerity argued it would not hurt growth and the deficit
would fall. Now there is finally a recovery of sorts, they argue austerity
worked, ignoring all the preceding five years and the unsustainable nature of
the current recovery (and the
limited
progress in reducing the deficit).
For Greece the much more severe austerity and its consequences means that
supporters are still obliged to rely on the helpful forecast to support their
case. The Martin Wolf piece includes a chart of IMF data on Greek government
debt as a percentage of GDP, which is reproduced in Fig.1 below.
The IMF includes not only data recorded in previous years but its own
projections for future years. From a government debt level of 176% of GDP in
2014, the IMF forecasts a fall to 174% this year and 171% in 2016 and much
sharper declines in future years. The IMF has also forecast an imminent decline
in Greek government debt ever since austerity was first imposed in 2010, which
has not materialised.
Fig. 1 Greek Government Debt, % GDP & IMF Projections
However, the most recent data released by the Greek statistical service
Elstat
shows
that Greek government debt rose once more (pdf) at the end of 2014 to stand
at €317bn. The total debt was €9bn higher in 2014 than 2013, whereas the IMF
forecast is effectively flat. Worse, as the Greek economy is still contracting
the debt as a proportion of GDP will be rising sharply, not falling as
officially projected.
In the course of 10 years the Greek government debt level has effectively
doubled as a proportion of GDP close to 180%. Most of this took place while
austerity was being implemented. The unavoidable verdict is that the debt burden
is unstainable and that austerity will only increase it.
To date the Syriza-led government has met all its obligations to creditors
but this clearly cannot go on for very long. It is possible that it may prefer
to default on the ECB, which can in the end simply print the money (as with its
Quantiative Easing programme, but from which it currently excludes Greece).
Defaulting on the IMF is perhaps more politically difficult, as its Board would
have to convene a meeting of all shareholders. €3.46bn is
due to the ECB on July
20.
But a default is necessary and inevitable. The authors of the Maastricht
Treaty thought that anything more than debt level equal to 60% of GDP was
dangerous. Then this would provide an appropriate target for Greek debt
reduction.
Investment flows
In the Martin Wolf piece he also suggests that debt reduction should occur
“after the completion of reforms”. This is mistaken. ‘Reform’ in the context of
the negotiations is a synonym for deregulation, privatisation, attacks on
workers’ rights and living standards. This has already been tried and failed. It
is a myth that too many Greek regulations, or too much state ownership, or
workers fighting for better pay and pensions is the cause of the crisis. All
those were in place in 2003 and 2004 when real GDP in Greece grew by 6.6% and 5%
respectively.
One myth that hardly needs to be dealt with any longer is that the crisis was
caused by imbalances within the Eurozone current accounts (the balance of trade
plus overseas interest payments). For a period this became a
key explanation
of the crisis (pdf) in the official ideology. It has been largely abandoned
as all the crisis countries have swung into surpluses. Greece now has a current
account surplus because imports have slumped and so remains in crisis.
A common feature of the crisis countries is that they were beset by huge
inflows of private sector capital seeking returns, primarily through speculation
in property and housing. It was when these private sector inflows dried up and
reversed that the crisis became apparent. Until austerity was imposed in 2010
the fall in Greek GDP due the recession was almost exactly the same as in
Germany or in Britain, a fall of approximately 4.75% in all cases.
The austerity policy and the ratings’ agencies induced panic had the effect
of driving capital flows back from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘core’ countries.
Ferocious austerity in Greece and the other crisis countries meant that private
sector banks withdrew capital and repatriated it to the key banking centres of
Europe: Britain, German, the Netherlands and France.
These private sector speculative flows were destabilising in both directions.
They caused both the boom and the bust in Greece and elsewhere. A solution based
on reviving these flows, with the inducement of ‘reform’ can only end in renewed
destabilisation and crisis. The desperation of these private sector investors is
demonstrated by the fact that, for most industrialised countries currently
(excepting Greece) borrowing rates are close to zero as unutilised capital seeks
a return.
Structural adjustment
The Greek economy needs structural adjustment. For the ideologues of
austerity this is a synonym for wage cuts. But Greek finance minister
Yannis
Varoufakis is right, cutting wages even further will have no effect on
improving Greek competitiveness in key industries, “we are not going to be
competitive with Mercedes-Benz and Toyota, simply because we don’t make cars.”
The structural adjustment needed is to increase the productive capacity of
the Greek economy. This requires productive investment on a large scale. Prior
to the crisis the EU did provide some transfers of funds for investment, as well
as current transfers in the form of the Common Agriculture Policy and other
funds (which is why the anti-austerity parties and most voters in the crisis
countries are not anti-EU). However, these were on an insufficiently large scale
and were in any event overwhelmed by the private sector inflows which were
primarily directed towards construction and housing.
Worse, the EU has cut its funding for investment as the crisis has deepened.
This has exacerbated the private sector withdrawal of capital and is an
important factor in prolonging the crisis. Fig.2 below shows the levels of
investment from the EU and the different forms of investment from the private
sector, both total investment (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) and productive
investment, which excludes housing.
Fig.2 Investment in Greece & Selected Components, % GDP
All types of investment have fallen as a proportion of GDP during the crisis.
But it was the EU’s declining contribution which led the way. In addition, the
real cuts in investment are flattered in this comparison as GDP itself was
falling. In 2006 productive investment from the EU to Greece amounted to €4.7bn.
In the depth of the crisis in 2012 it had been cut to €1.6bn.
This is a punitive measure and is entirely contradictory to the objective
needs of the Greek economy. All properly functioning single currency areas
require significant fiscal transfers in order to be sustainable. This follows
from the fact that all regions or countries in a monetary union are subject to
very similar monetary conditions (official interest rates, exchange rates, and
so on) yet have very different levels of productivity. Those levels of
productivity will diverge to a crisis point unless there are sufficient fiscal
transfers to compensate. If the fiscal transfers are sufficiently large and
well-directed, they can even compress or reverse the divergence in productivity.
Currently, the policy of the Troika is to lay siege to the government in Athens
in an attempt to starve it into submission.
As a result, the Greek economy is at that crisis point. It requires very
large fiscal transfers otherwise it will diverge out of the Eurozone. This is in
addition to the requirement for a very substantial debt write-off already noted.
Even then, very strong government and supranational measures would be required
to direct the inevitable revival of private sector investment that would
inevitably follow a large increase in (supranational) public sector investment.
The public sector must begin to direct large-scale investment.
Martin Wolf is quite right to attempt to disabuse the ideologues of austerity
of their Greek myths. There is no prospect of an end to the crisis without very
substantial debt reduction. It is also reckless bravado to claim that only
Greece would be hit by a forced exit from the Euro. But even debt reduction is
insufficient to end the crisis, and further ‘reforms’ would only deepen it. Very
large fiscal transfers to pay for a structural upgrade of the Greek economy are
necessary.
The biggest beneficiaries of the EU are the big firms and banks in the
leading EU economies. They need to start paying for this benefit or they will
lose it.