Friday, 11 May 2018

An Outbreak of Crass Cross-Party Economics

By Tom O’Leary

There has recently been a spate of cross-party economic initiatives. Ostensibly they are designed to reach a ‘non-political’ consensus to address some areas of public policy where there is clearly a crisis, such as the NHS. In reality, the Tory government is turning to others for support and the Labour right and others are only too willing to help them.

The result is economically illiterate. But it may prove useful for addressing another crisis altogether, the legitimacy of the Tory government itself. It is all designed to prevent Jeremy Corbyn becoming the next Prime Minister.

The most glaring example of the nonsensical ideas designed to build a cross-party consensus is the notion of ‘hypothecating’ or ring-fencing National Insurance Contributions (NICs) to pay for the NHS (pdf). Almost all streams of government revenue as sensitive to the business cycle, NICs included. As Chart 1 below shows, revenues from NICs do not climb steadily but are interrupted by occasional sharp downturns coinciding with recessions.

Chart1. Revenues from NICs, £ millions,1946 to 2017


In contrast, outlays on elements of social spending such as the NHS continuously rise. In some recessions or prolonged slumps that rise accelerates as health deteriorates. We may be in one such period now. The growing queues and waiting lists reflect the government’s refusal to meet this increased demand.

The idea of hypothecating NICs revenue to fund the NHS can only appeal at the most superficial level. In the most recent year, the revenues and outlays almost matched, at around £130 billion.

But this overlooks the important fact that the NHS is already considerably underfunded. According to the King’s Fund, because of the further funding squeeze already announced in the Tories’ 2017 Budget, there will be shortfall of £20 billion by 2022/23 even compared to current NHS levels of provision.

The NHS is not just cyclically but is structurally underfunded. At 9.7% of GDP UK spending remains above the OECD average, as shown in Chart 2 below. But this includes economies whose per capita incomes are way below that of the UK. Almost all the countries with lower health spending are poorer than the UK. In addition, as UK real GDP growth has been exceptionally weak, this flatters the level of spending on health care.

Chart 2. Health spending in the OECD as a proportion of GDP, 2016

The consequences of this underfunding are severe. There is a very strong correlation between health spending and life expectancy. UK life expectancy has fallen back towards the OECD average, which includes these economies with far lower incomes than the UK. It has also seen one of the smallest improvements in the OECD over the long run. This is shown in Chart 3 below, taken from the OECD Health at a Glance 2017.

Chart 3. Life expectancy at birth, 1970 and 2015

In some parts of the country, where there has been prolonged disinvestment, life expectancy is actually falling in absolute terms. Although the Financial Times managed to see the silver lining, arguing that it would reduce companies’ pension deficits.

The central fallacy of the hypothecation argument is to ignore the fact that health spending rises as a proportion of GDP over time. This is because improving living standards require greater spending on health, and ageing populations require a greater proportion of incomes to be spent on health. This means any government revenue stream linked to GDP growth, such as NICs, will fall short of what is required to fund a decent health service.

According to the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) revenues from NICs will barely increase as a proportion of GDP over the next 40 years, while outlays on health will rise proportionally by over 70%. The authors of the hypothecation report must surely know this, even if some of their political supporters do not. In effect, the attempt is to limit the natural rise in health spending by throwing a millstone around its neck. The consequences would be very adverse for the quality of health care and could be dramatic for life expectancy.

The effort to promote cross-party ‘solutions’ to serious economic and social questions is not confined to the NHS spending/NICs revenues. Recently there has been a welcome for Jeremy Hunt in announcing £6 million in support for children of alcoholic parents, even though the Tories cut £598 million in mental health services annually. There are many such similar examples, representing a concerted effort to shield the Tories from the fall-out of their own policies.

Politically, there has also been a revival of the ‘progressive alliance’ project. There is nothing progressive about Labour promoting the LibDems, or giving way to any forces to their right.

These are not policy proposals to address real issues. They are window-dressing on the austerity project. They are also an attempt to sow confusion to shield the Tories’ benefit and to prevent the Corbyn-led Labour Party from reaping the political benefit of its own anti-austerity policies. 

Wednesday, 11 April 2018

How Labour can transform the economy under Corbyn - The economic impact of increased investment

By Tom O’Leary

The UK economy remains mired in stagnation caused by the crisis of investment. The official forecasts for UK growth point to the weakest expansion in the economy in the modern era, since 1945.

The economic policy of the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell is to increase public investment as a way out of the crisis, which is entirely correct. In addition, there will be increased spending on public services, the NHS, education and so on, financed by increasing taxes on big businesses and the rich. This amounts to reversing the tax give-aways under the Tory policy of austerity, which was fundamentally a transfer of incomes from workers and the poor to big business and the rich and is also entirely appropriate.

The purpose of this piece is to examine the economic impact that increased investment, using the latest developments in statistical analysis of the medium-term determinants of growth.

Accounting for growth

As there is widespread confusion on this matter, it is important first to establish what are the factors that determine economic growth. It is widely and incorrectly asserted that these are variously, increasing ‘demand’, increasing the supply of money, increasing Consumption, improved innovation, or rising ‘entrepreneurial activity’. None of these assertions is correct.

The world’s leading expert on productivity growth is Dale Jorgenson. The methodology he and his colleagues have expounded and elaborated in several works has been adopted in growth accounting by the OECD, among others. In ‘Productivity and the World Economy’ (pdf) he writes,

“The contributions of capital and labor inputs have emerged as the predominant sources of economic growth in both advanced and emerging economies. Economic growth depends primarily on investments in human and non-human capital, including investments in both tangible and intangible assets”.

Using the analysis outlined in his work it is possible to identify the impact of ‘investment in human and non-human capital.’

Jorgenson’s research shows that it is the amount of capital and the amount of labour, as well as their quality, that are the decisive factors in growth. This statistical analysis refutes all efforts to portray growth as ‘demand-led’, or ‘aggregate demand-led’, or a function of innovation, or entrepreneurial activity, or other myths.

In Jorgenson’s new book, ‘The World Economy’ (with Fukao and Timmer) he argues that one of its major findings is that, “replication rather than innovation is the major source of growth in the world economy. Replication takes place by adding identical production units with no change in technology. Labor input grows through the addition of new members of the labor force with the same education and experience. Capital input expands by providing new production units with the same collection of plant and equipment. Output expands in proportion with no change in productivity.”

The empirical proof of this analysis can be found through economic history up to and including the current crisis. In 2007 and 2008 the US and then all the leading capitalist economies did not suddenly experience a downturn in demand, or Consumption, or money supply growth, firms did not stop innovating and ‘entrepreneurs’ did not stop trying to make profits.

It should also be added that, among the real factors accounting for growth, the labour force did not stop growing (on the contrary, unemployment surged in many countries) and the education systems did not suddenly deteriorate.

In reality the 2007-2008 recession was caused by a slump in private sector investment and the continued stagnation of the leading economies is a function of the continued weakness of private sector investment. This is illustrated in Chart 1 below.

Chart1. G7 Gross Fixed Capital Formation & Private Consumption Growth 2004 to 2017


As Chart 1 shows, there was no crisis of Consumption until well after the Investment slump had already begun. By mid-2007 Investment growth in the G7 had slowed to a crawl and begun to contract a few months later. At that time Consumption continued to grow at its previous pace and did not begin to contract until the second half of 2008. Widespread measures to stimulate Consumption coming out of the crisis have only had a limited effect, largely leading to an increase in household indebtedness. Investment growth has never properly recovered and it is this that accounts for the continued stagnation in the G7 economies.

Accounting for investment

Just as in the G7 as a whole, the UK recession was caused by a slump in private sector investment as shown in Chart2 below.


Despite the fact that Investment is a far smaller component of UK GDP than Consumption, the contraction in Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) was far greater than the decline in Final Consumption. From the pre-recession peak to the trough at the low-point of the recession Consumption fell by £54.8 billion, while Investment fell by £70.4 billion.

Likewise, although Consumption growth has been exceptionally weak it now stands £136.8 billion above is pre-recession peak, while Investment is just £18.4bn above is pre-recession. Consequently the proportion of the economy directed towards Investment has decline from the pre-recession peak of 17.9% to 17.1% of GDP at the end of 2017. It is this that accounts for the weakness of growth overall and therefore the weakness of the growth in Consumption. This corresponds to the Jorgenson analysis.

From this analysis it follows that the Labour policy of increasing Investment is entirely correct. Furthermore, the policy of only borrowing to increase Investment is also correct. Only Investment to increase the productive capacity of the economy (the increase in the ‘means of production’) can sustainably increase the level of production of that economy.

But what is the likely return on that Investment? Or, put another way, what should be the level of Investment in order to achieve specific policy objectives of increased growth in output?

Here the Jorgenson analysis is indispensable. Its results are available from the Conference Board, which uses the same methods and data.

In the Conference Board Total Economy Database (adjusted version) May 2017, the contributions to UK GDP growth over the medium-term of capital inputs, labour inputs and Total Factor Productivity are shown as follows: Capital 0.9%, Labour 0.7% and TFP 0.2%. UK GDP itself grows by an average of 1.8% per annum over the medium-term (1990 to 2016), the aggregate of those inputs.


Chart3. Contributions to UK GDP Growth, per cent, 1990 to 2016

Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database (adjusted version) May 2017


Within the category of Labour inputs the contribution of labour quality is a negative, at 0.1% and the total contribution of Labour inputs is entirely a function of the growth on the quantity of labour, +0.8%. Labour quantity can be increased either by increasing the productive workforce or by the existing workforce working longer hours, or some combination of the two. But in either event, the scope for increasing per capita living standards without increasing hours is almost wholly dependent on increases in Capital inputs.

Therefore, any sustainable increase in output per hour worked is overwhelmingly determined by the growth in capital inputs. The Corbyn-McDonnell focus on investment is therefore entirely correct, based on the most sophisticated mainstream economic analysis. (An entirely separate set of policies are needed to address the decline in labour quality inputs identified above, but that is not the subject of this piece).

The return on investment

The Conference Board data also allows an analysis of the return on capital investment which is the addition to the productive capacity of the economy, or the increase in the means of production.

The Incremental Capital-Output Ratio (ICOR) measures the ratio between increased Capital deployed and the resulting change in the annual level of output over the medium-term. From this it is possible to identify two effects. First, it is possible to identify the likely return on a given level of investment (if the ICOR remains unchanged). Secondly, it is possible to identify the required level of investment to achieve a specific level of increased output (again, if the ICOR remains unchanged).

At 2016, the Conference Board 5-year moving average for the UK ICOR is 8.0. This means that an increase in annual output over the medium-term of £1 billion requires an increase in investment of £8 billion. The same ratio applies if the numerator is changed. So, an annual increase in output over the medium-term equivalent to 1% of GDP requires an increase in investment of 8% of GDP.

In the Conference Board Total Economy Database the UK ICOR was not always so high. Prior to the recession that began in 2008, the ICOR fluctuated around 6.0. This would reduce the level of investment required to achieve a given level of increased output, or would increase the level of output arising from a given increase in investment. But it remains to be seen whether there has been a permanent or at least enduring deterioration in the ratio or whether this is a hangover from the slump.

In any event, using the ICOR identified from the Conference Board Database, it is possible to examine the effects of Labour’s commitment to increased public sector investment.

Increased public sector investment

Labour’s economic policy is to borrow only for increased public sector investment. The consequent growth can allow for further increases in investment or increased public spending on services, or some combination of the two.

From the analysis above it is possible to identify the impact of planned investment. Each increase in public sector investment of £8 billion increases the medium-term level of output by £1 billion. Labour’s plan is to increase public sector investment by £25 billion each year compared to current levels. This would directly increase medium-term output by a little over £3 billion each year. There may be indirect or induced positive effects on increasing private sector investment, but these cannot be known or certain in advance.

Over the lifetime of a 5-year parliament the cumulative effect of this increased Investment would be £125 billion. Applying the ICOR ratio of 8.0, this would increase medium-term output by just over £15.6 billion. By using the current level of nominal GDP of a little over £2 trillion (or £2,000 billion), the net effect of Labour’s plans would be to increase GDP over the medium-term by the equivalent of almost 0.8% of GDP.

However, on a reasonable assumption of continued economic growth and therefore expansion in GDP, over the medium term the cumulative effects of investment would be slightly reduced, as GDP will have expanded. So, the effect would be closer to an increase of 0.75% in GDP over a five year period, or 0.15% per annum for the lifetime of the parliament. Using the same ratios, if the policy aim was to achieve a 0.25% increase in GDP per annum this would require the level of planned Investment to rise to £40 billion per annum.

There are two further points worth emphasizing. Up to this point, the subject for discussion has been the medium-term consequences of increased Investment on raising the level of GDP. But the actual expenditure on investment also raises output in the short-run, in the year or years that the Investment is made. The first point is that the immediate effect of increasing public sector investment by £25 billion each year will itself increase GDP by 1.25% each year, in the very short-run. The effect of Labour’s policy will undoubtedly be an important boost to the economy and therefore to living standards.

The second point is that Labour’s economic inheritance will be extremely poor, even on official forecasts. Therefore it may be necessary, within the limits of what is realistically possible to borrow, to increase the planned level of increased public sector investment, simply to stave off a deteriorating economic situation. In that case, further measures may be necessary, not just increased borrowing but also measures to direct investment through existing public sector bodies, the new National Investment Bank and in the private sector itself.

Monday, 9 April 2018

Trump's tariffs against China are bad news for US farmers, companies and workers!

By John Ross

In drawing up its list of tariffs on $50 billion of Chinese products the Trump administration carefully tried to avoid one of the chief bad effects these tariffs will have on the US population by excluding many consumer goods from the list. This was clear proof the administration feared the hostile reaction from US consumers as prices went up on these imported goods in US shops. But by concentrating on trying to lessen the impact on US consumers the Trump administration has necessarily increased the negative effects on US jobs and particularly US manufacturers and farmers.

This has meant it has not really concealed the negative effects on the US economy at all. Therefore, within hours of the US announcement, and even before China’s firm response, even Western commentators were accurately pointing out the main groups within the US itself that would be hit by the tariffs.

It is important to understand not only the impact on China of the Trump proposed tariffs but also the impact in the US. It is therefore worth looking at accurate Western studies of this.

Impact on US manufacturers

David Fickling, writing in Bloomberg, noted the effect of the US tariffs may remove as much as half of the benefit which the Trump administration recently gave to US manufacturing companies via tax cuts. Bloomberg’s headline was clear: ‘Trump Tariffs Stick It to U.S. Manufacturers. Firms might as well give back half of that $26 billion-a-year tax cut they just got.’

Fickling entirely accurately analysed the attempted concealment of the impact of the US actions on the US economy and population: ‘the list [of US tariffs] appears to have been chosen with care. Officials started with all products felt to benefit from Chinese industrial policies, before removing those that were "likely to cause disruptions to the U.S. economy," those that would hit consumers' pockets hardest, and those that couldn't have levies for legal or administrative reasons.

‘The protection of individuals' wallets is probably the most important part of that… China has a substantial advantage in this trade war in that the majority of its biggest exports to the U.S. are consumer goods whose purchasers tend to be price-sensitive voters. Trade in the opposite direction focuses far more on intermediate products bought by Chinese companies expected to do their bit for Beijing. By sparing consumers, Lighthizer is sending a strong signal he won't let this fight be lost because of discontent on the home front.

‘That's why, while hundreds of product lines under tariff code 85 (electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof) will be subject to a 25 percent impost, subsection 8517 -- mobile phones, which constitute about 40 percent of U.S. imports from China for that category -- won't suffer a cent.’

But by exempting many consumer goods, while simultaneously aiming to meet the $50 billion target for sectors hit by tariffs the Trump administration had wanted, the US has been forced to affect a much wider range of non-consumer goods. Again, as the Bloomberg article correctly noted, it is a: ‘fact that the plan will most likely hurt the parts of the economy it purports to help. Another way of looking at the $12.5 billion that will be levied is that it's essentially the government taking back about half of that roughly $26 billion-a-year tax cut it just delivered to manufacturers.

‘Once you consider the ways domestic suppliers could raise prices in response to the reduced competition from China (as is already happening with steel and aluminum), the cost to end-product manufacturers will probably be higher. Producer prices in the sector are already rising at the fastest pace in almost six years; the squeeze to profits should intensify before it eases.

‘The second point is related. The list at present isn't written in stone -- instead it will be put out to industry consultation for 60 days. That gives manufacturers ample time to make their complaints to Washington, and to get their carve-outs in return. The Trump administration isn't famed for its resistance to such influence: 195 of the executive branch's 2,684 appointees are former lobbyists, according to a database by journalism nonprofit ProPublica.

‘Such pushback will probably be to the benefit of a U.S. economy that was doing perfectly well before the current skirmish came along. But it will weaken Washington's hand in the months ahead. The National Association of Manufacturers is already calling for a trade agreement, rather than the current path toward a conflict.’

Fickling’s overall conclusion was entirely accurate: ‘President Donald Trump must now choose whether his main objective is helping American manufacturers, or sticking it to the Chinese. He can't have both.’

US farmers protest

In addition to the impact on US manufacturers the Financial Times particularly noted the effect of the US farm sector and the reactions from it: ‘Max Baucus, a former senator from Montana and US ambassador to China who now serves as the co-chairman of the lobby group Farmers for Free Trade, said farmers were being “squeezed from all sides” by the Trump administration’s attack on China.

‘“First, the tariffs the US announced today will make the [agricultural] equipment and inputs they rely on more expensive. Then they will face new tariffs on their exports when China retaliates,” Mr Baucus said. “American farmers are watching this daily trade escalation closely, and they are worried.”

‘US business groups have called for the Trump administration to rethink its plan for tariffs, arguing that while they shared its concerns about China’s intellectual property regime the White House plan amounted to new taxes on US consumers and businesses… “imposing taxes on products used daily by American consumers and job creators is not the way to achieve those ends,” said Myron Brilliant, the head of international affairs at the US Chamber of Commerce.’

The action China has now announced on US soybeans exports will of course tighten that squeeze on US farmers. The Financial Times noted: ‘John Heisdorffer, president of the American Soybean Association, warned that the Chinese tariff would “have a devastating effect on every soybean farmer in America”. He urged Mr Trump to “engage the Chinese in a constructive manner, not a punitive one”.’

The strategic target of the US tariffs

Bloomberg also analysed that the clear aim of the tariffs was to attempt to block China’s advance into more technologically advanced production. It noted “The tariffs may have only a minor economic impact, increasing levies by $12.5 billion on Chinese shipments to the U.S. that reached $506 billion last year, said Shane Oliver, the head of investment strategy at AMP Capital Investors Ltd. in Sydney. That’s an average tariff increase on overall imports from China of just 2.5 percent, he said.” But: ‘In targeting sectors that Beijing is openly trying to promote, the U.S. is signaling that its strategic aim in the current conflict is preventing China from gaining the global technological leadership that it wants.”’

But in attempting to block China’s rise the Trump administration has launched an attack not only on China but on US companies, workers and farmers. The outcome of the situation will be decided by the interaction of both fronts in this battle.

The above article was previously published here on Learning from China.

Tuesday, 27 March 2018

The worst outlook in the modern era

By Tom O’Leary

The economic outlook for the UK is the worst it has been in the modern era, the entire post-World War II period. This is not the verdict of some rabidly anti-Tory propaganda. It is based on the UK Treasury’s own forecasts for GDP.

The Treasury’s forecasts for real GDP from 2018 to 2022 are reproduced below, from the Chancellor’s Spring Statement. The average annual GDP growth is forecast to be just 1.4% over the period, and growth will never exceed 1.5%. This compares to 1.7% growth in 2017, which was itself significantly below the long-term average growth rate and the weakest since 2012. According to official forecasts, the best of this recovery is already behind us.

Chart 1. UK Treasury Real GDP Growth Forecasts, 2018 to 2022
Source: UK Treasury/OBR

Over the medium-term, this will be the slowest growth rate of any period in the modern era. Chart 2 below shows the growth rate of UK real GDP from 1949 to 2017, plus the 15-year moving average. Using a 15-year moving average has the effect of removing the short-term fluctuations of the business cycle. To date the slowest growth rate on this measure of the 15-year moving average is the current one. The average growth rate over the 15 years to 2017 is just 1.7%.

Chart 2. UK Real GDP Growth and 15year Moving Average
 
However, if the Treasury’s forecasts for the next 5 years are included then the 15-year moving average real GDP growth falls to 1.2% by 2022. This is significantly below anything that has been experienced in the modern era. This is shown in Chart 3 below.

Chart 3. UK Real GDP Growth and 15year Moving Average + Forecast to 2022
 
1.2% average annual growth is exceptionally low. It is half of what had often previously been cited as the trend growth rate of the UK economy of 2.5%. If these forecasts are approximately accurate, they will have severe negative consequences for living standards and for public finances and public services for many years to come. 

The ‘political centre ground’ will also continue to erode as radical economic and social policies will be sought. The next SEB piece will address the appropriate perspective for ending economic stagnation.

Wednesday, 14 February 2018

Navigating a way out of the crisis

By Tom O’Leary

The UK economy is in such a parlous state that the Bank of England is threatening to raise interest rates even though last year’s GDP growth rate was a feeble 1.8% and real wages continue to decline. This is a striking effect of the dearth of investment since the Great Recession.

The Bank’s Governor Mark Carney is concerned about capacity constraints in the economy leading to inflation. This lack of capacity, the weak growth in the means of production, arises because there has been a woeful lack of productive investment from before the recession began in 2008.

The UK economy is actually receiving a lift from the upturn in the world economy, particularly in Europe, but its relative position is declining. In effect, as the world economy is expected to see its best growth rate since 2010, the UK economy is expected to see its worst growth rate since that time.

In the three years from 2017 to 2019, the latest projections from the IMF are that the world economy will accelerate to an average of just over 3.8% real GDP growth. At the same time the UK economy will decelerate to less than half that growth rate, to just under 1.6%. By contrast, the advanced economies as a whole are expected to accelerate to just under 2.3%. The IMF expects that the main driver of world growth will come from what it describes as ‘Emerging market and developing economies’ at just under 4.9% growth, led by India and China.

The IMF has no crystal ball, and frequently makes incorrect forecasts. But the divergence in growth expectations for the UK economy compared with most of the rest of the world is striking. The UK is also one of only two economies it highlights where the IMF has downgraded its growth expectations.

The UK economy is already in poor shape. The advanced economies have been crawling along in growth terms since the crisis began. Using IMF projections for the next two years, these advanced economies will have grown cumulatively by just 17.1% over 12 years. But the UK economy will have grown even more slowly, by just 14.3%. The relative growth rates for the UK and for the advanced economies as a whole are shown in Chart 1 below.

Chart 1. UK, Advanced Economies Real GDP Growth, 2000 to 2019 (Forecast)
 
Austerity and the deficit

Even the UK’s sub-standard growth rate does not provide an accurate picture of the bleak outlook for living standards. In addition to the sharp deterioration in public services and social welfare provisions, the labour share of national income has fallen sharply since the imposition of austerity in 2010, as shown in Chart 2 below.

Chart 2. UK Labour and Profit Share of National Income, %, 1997 to 2016
 
Austerity can be seen as an attempt to drive up the profit share from its low-point of 17.1% in mid-2009, just after the crisis began. The prolonged effort has only been partially successful, as the profit share has increased from its low-point, yet it remains far below its pre-crisis highs at the turn of this century.

But the labour share (in an economy that is barely crawling along) has not recovered from its end-2009 peak. Mathematically, the labour share is an independent variable, not determined by the growth rate of GDP and instead determined by the struggle between workers and bosses over wages, pensions and other entitlements. In reality, the struggle for higher or even constant wages is exceptionally difficult when the economy is not expanding more rapidly.

Real wages are now 3% below their peak level in March 2008, as shown in Chart 3. Nominal wages rose 19.5% over the same period, but the two currency devaluations of the pound, one arising from the recession and the other following the Brexit vote, have more than eroded that rise in cash terms via inflation.

Chart 3. UK Real and Nominal Wages

Higher wages, just like improved public services and social provisions are much easier to achieve with higher economic growth. But the widespread expectation is that UK growth will be slowing over the next period. This has negative consequences for living standards in the broadest sense, including real pay, social welfare and public services. The consequence for government finances will also be worse, as tax revenue growth will be curbed and outlays related to poverty and under-employment will be higher.

Therefore, in order to address the crisis in living standards and wages, and to tackle the glaring problems in areas such as housing, the NHS, social security, public sector pay and so on, radical measures will be required at a time when government finances are once more under pressure. 

Even if Carney is proved wrong in his forecasts of the Bank’s own actions, his pronouncements show that the UK economy could become locked in low growth over the very long-term, with every modest upturn met with higher interest rates to choke off the threat of inflation. To be clear, in mainstream economic policy making all types of inflation are allowed, house prices, stocks and bonds, even Bitcoin. But wage inflation is not permissible and it is this ‘threat’ the Bank of England is poised to prevent.

Navigating a way out of the crisis

Since the recession a number of measures have been adopted which have been designed to boost the economy by raising demand (‘Help to Buy’) or by creating money (‘Quantitative Easing’). By themselves, they are unable to sustainably raise the growth rate of an economy which remains in crisis because of weak investment.

The UK economy is experiencing a productivity crisis, which is not a ‘puzzle’ or ‘mystery’ as is widely claimed, but is instead a function of its low rate of investment. The advanced industrialised countries as a whole are also experiencing a productivity crisis, and the UK is simply among the worst because its level of investment is among the worst.

Productivity matters, because without increasing productivity any rise in living standards is dependent on working harder, or longer hours, or labour trying to claim a greater share of national income from capital.

The world’s leading expert on productivity growth is Dale Jorgenson. In ‘Productivity and the World Economy’ (pdf) he writes,

“The contributions of capital and labor inputs have emerged as the predominant sources of economic growth in both advanced and emerging economies. Economic growth depends primarily on investments in human and non-human capital, including investments in both tangible and intangible assets”.

Using the analysis outlined in his work it is possible to identify the impact of ‘investment in human and non-human capital.’

Jorgenson’s research shows that it is the amount of capital and the amount of labour, as well as their quality, that are the decisive factors in growth. This statistical analysis refutes all efforts to portray growth as ‘demand-led’, or ‘aggregate demand-led’, or a function of innovation, or entrepreneurial activity, or other myths.

In Jorgenson’s new book, ‘The World Economy’ (edited with Fukao and Timmer) he argues that one of its major findings is that, “replication rather than innovation is the major source of growth in the world economy. Replication takes place by adding identical production units with no change in technology. Labor input grows through the addition of new members of the labor force with the same education and experience. Capital input expands by providing new production units with the same collection of plant and equipment. Output expands in proportion with no change in productivity.”

Jorgenson also analyses the historical impact of changes in these inputs for total growth in a variety of economies, including lesser economies like the UK. Using these analytical tools, it is possible to outline a projection of growth for the UK economy based on increasing those inputs, capital and labour, in line with the Labour Party’s intention to end austerity and reverse it. In a follow-up piece, that outline will be presented.